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Dispute Resolution: Raising the Bar
and Enlarging the Canon
Introduction
Carrie Menkel-Meadow
The articles which follow were prepared for the AALS 2003 Workshop on
Dispute Resolution: Raising the Bar and Enlarging the Canon. The committee
that planned the workshop sought to explore how the field of dispute resolution (born of courses in negotiation, mediation, and "alternative" dispute
resolution) has expanded its focus in the last twenty years, both in disciplinary
breath and scope and in subject matters taught. Twenty-one years earlier the
first AALS Workshop on Dispute Resolution, held at Harvard Law School,
sought to launch the field, define issues for research and exploration, and
demonstrate multiple means of teaching its theoretical and practical knowledge for modern lawyers.
The 2003 workshop focused on how the field has expanded to embrace a
wide variety of disciplines that inform law from outside, including economics,
psychology, sociology, and philosophy, and how new issues of concern have
emerged-including the roles of emotions, culture, cognition, ethics, and
mindfulness-in the teaching and practice of what lawyers do when they
attempt to resolve or handle disputes or negotiate transactions. The workshop
was designed to focus on the past, present, and future of research and
teaching issues in the field, not only for those teachers and scholars already in
the field, but also for those in contiguous subjects, such as civil procedure,
contracts, property, constitutional law, and clinics.
The articles published here were all presented at plenary sessions of the
workshop. My article, which began the workshop, reflects on the modem
history of the treatment of dispute handling as a legal process, now studied as
the more multidisciplinary field of "conflict resolution," suggesting that legal
educators and scholars must broaden their conceptions of what is relevant to
human dispute and transaction "handling," both in questions conceptualized
and in how dispute resolution is "operationalized" in teaching and practice.
Jennifer Gerarda Brown explores the insights derived from economics generally and law and economics more specifically in terms of individual judgments,
cognitive distortions and inefficiencies, and the surprising and often
counterintuitive patterns of behaviors that occur when people seek to resolve
disputes or effectuate deals in strategic interactions. Howard Gadlin explores
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other counterintuitive findings from social science research that explores why
and how people choose to dispute with each other: Why do so many young
people continue to smoke although cigarette smoking is declared unhealthy?
Why do some people (lawyers?) continue to enjoy disputes and conflicts as we
develop more and more methods of seeking good solutions to legal disputes
that the parties can consent to? Chris Guthrie and Nancy Welsh explore
contributions to dispute processing from two different sides of social psychology-cognitive errors we make that undermine our notions of "rational"
decision making, and the power of "fair" processes to make us believe in
process, regardless of whether we win or lose, derived from empirical study of
a field called procedural justice.
A second series of papers illustrates how applications of different disciplines and knowledge bases should affect the teaching and practice of dispute
resolution, particularly in modern law schools. Pat Chew explores the role of
both culture and "multiculturalism" in disputes that involve actors from
"different" world views. Leonard Riskin examines how mindfulness and the
practices of deep consciousness and reflection can make better dispute resolvers, lawyers, and human beings. Scott Peppet analyzes some of the many
ethical dilemmas facing third-party neutrals and second-party negotiators as
they try to be effective problem solvers for those in dispute or conflict.
The symposium also includes an article which was not presented at the
workshop, but which illustrates the concerns of workshop sessions directed
explicitly to teaching issues-Michael Moffitt's article on different forms of
student performance evaluations in negotiation courses. Frank Sander-for
many of us the father of dispute resolution teaching and research in the law
schools-concludes the symposium and reflects on where the field has been,
where it is going, and what it offers by way of legal change and transformation
for law, legal studies, and legal institutions.
The workshop itself explored a wide variety of issues demonstrating that
both quality and subject matter of issues directly related to dispute resolution
have expanded to include such areas as multiparty dispute resolution, the role
of special masters in complex disputes, procedural and social justice in dispute resolution, systems design, mass torts, arbitration pedagogy, conducting
and using empirical research and evaluation studies, the role oflaw in dispute
resolution, the collaborative law movement, and the roles of ethics and
emotions in negotiation and mediation. The message from these articles
should be clear for legal academics: how human beings learn to live together
by managing their conflicts-planning and executing the transactions and
deals and trust of their relationships, both commercial and familial-is no
longer a matter of simply studying legal doctrine and procedure. Learning
about dispute and conflict resolution and making transactions happen implicate many disciplines, which should spur us on to consider more varied ways
of teaching.
Members of the planning committee of the workshop, responsible for
bringing you these rich articles, were Leonard Riskin, chair, University of
Missouri-Columbia; Carol Liebman, Columbia University;JamesAlfini, North-
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ern Illinois University; Gerald Williams, Brigham Young University; and James
Coben, Hamline University. They had assistance from Chistopher Honeyman,
a national expert in dispute processes in a wide variety of fields, who served as
consultant to the committee. Through the good offices of Gerald Williams,
many of the papers presented at the workshop are collected here for your
reading pleasure and-more important-to inspire you to "raise the bar and
enlarge the canon" of your own teaching, whether in dispute resolution
courses or in any law school course which considers how human beings come
together or fall apart.
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From Legal Disputes to Conflict
Resolution and Human Problem
Solving: Legal Dispute Resolution in a
Multidisciplinary Context
Carrie Menkel-Meadow

Legal Process, Conflict, and Justice
Although this essay traces my own intellectual journey as a teacher and
scholar of "alternative dispute resolution," it describes as well the evolution of
the field of dispute resolution (rooted in legal studies) to the now broader
field of conflict resolution that encompasses the study of disputes and conflicts, not only when they "come to law" in legal disputes, but in all forms of
human conflict, including the interpersonal, domestic, and international.
While my work began in legal disputing, it quickly moved to the more interdisciplinary study of conflict resolution when I sought better solutions to human
problems than those afforded by courts or unprincipled compromises in
conventional negotiation processes.
Several important themes have emerged as dispute resolution in law has
expanded to include the fuller study of human conflict situations. First,
although necessary and important in some cases, conventional legal processes, like adjudication and adversarial negotiation, are often inadequate for
a fuller satisfaction of human needs and interests, and so we must look to
other processes than traditional institutions or practices, depending on the
kind of conflict or dispute at issue. With a growing availability of different
kinds of processes for different kinds of matters, we are also developing a
broader array of "process institutions." This is "process pluralism" and should
expand the focus of what is studied in law and jurisprudence. Second, while
much of my work could be characterized as "procedural" or "process" driven,
I am also concerned with exploring where our substantive solutions to human
problems come from and how we can improve upon the human repertoire for

Carrie Menkel-Meadow is a professor at the Georgetown University Law Center and director of
the Georgetown-Hewlett Program in Conflict Resolution and Legal Problem Solving.
This essay is the basis of the plenary talk delivered at the Workshop on Dispute Resolution:
Raising the Bar and Enlarging the Canon at the 2003 annual meeting of the AALS. It is a
modified version of the introductory essay to Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Dispute Processing and
Conflict Resolution: Theory, Practice and Policy (Burlington, 2003).
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problem solving. This is the "creativity" in human conflict resolution that I
believe is necessary for our future survival. Third, developments in the parallel
fields of legal dispute resolution and the more multidisciplinary conflict
resolution provide us with a special opportunity to explore the correspondences, contrasts, and learning from domestic disputes and international
conflicts, as we test whether particular concepts, approaches, and processes
can be generalized or have only contextual validity. Finally, my work in the
field of dispute and conflict resolution has always been a movement back and
forth from theory development to practice, seeking what Donald Schon has
called "theory-in-use"l and what I have called "ethical practice"-practice that
is informed by theory and by morally legitimate uses. Disputes and conflicts
are human constructs. We need theory to understand their causes, dynamics,
and trajectories of actions and reactions, but ultimately we need practice to
use conflict creatively and constructively, to make 'Justice" in legal terms and
to make "peace" in human terms.
If recent world events have taught us anything, it is that conflict and
conflicting notions of the good are inevitable for human beings. So, while
many of us seek ways to establish more universal notions of the good toward
which to direct our human efforts, it has, sadly, become, in the early years of
the twenty-first century, more common for us to assume there will be basic
value differences among us. We should, then, spend our time thinking about
how we can at least develop fair and considerate processes for communicating
enough with each other so that we may act with the most benefit and the least
harm. Some offer hopes that "the rule of law" can be universalized as a
principled way to resolve conflicts, domestically and internationally. Others of
us see law as often conflictual, indeterminate, and politically contested or
manipulable, or so focused on the need for regulation of the aggregate that
it cannot always do 'Justice" in particular cases. Legal justice is not always
actual justice.
The social philosopher Stuart Hampshire has recently concluded, in his
book Justice Is Conflict, that while we may never agree about what the content of
universal justice is "because there never will be such a harmony, either in the
soul or in the city," we might instead come closer to recognizing that "fairness
in procedures for resolving conflicts is the fundamental kind of fairness, and
that it is acknowledged as a value in most cultures, places, and times: fairness
in procedure is an invariable value, a constant in human nature. "2 Hampshire
goes on to say-in words eloquent enough to make one feel proud of what has
constituted at least half of a lifetime's work of theorizing and practice 10
conflict resolution-that
[b]ecause there will always be conflicts between conceptions of the good,
moral conflicts, both in the soul and in the city, there is everywhere a well-

1.

See Donald A. Schon, The Reflective Practitioner: How Professionals Think in Action (New
York, 1983); Donald A. Schon & Martin Rein, Frame Reflection: Toward the Resolution of
Intractable Policy Controversies (New York, 1994).

2.

Stuart Hampshire,Justice Is Conflict 4 (Princeton, 2000).
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recognized need for procedures of conflict resolution, which can replace
brute force and domination and tyranny.3
The existence of such an institution [for conflict resolution], and the particular
form of its rules and conventions of procedure are matters of historical
contingency. There is no rational necessity about the more specific rules and
conventions determining the criteria for success in argument in any particular
institution, except the overriding necessity that each side in the conflict
should be heard putting its case ("audi alteram par/em '].4
[T]he skillful management of conflicts [is] among the highest of human
skills. 5

Hampshire identifies several principles which are crucial to understanding
the importance of procedural justice.
1. Conflict is human and ubiquitous. Conflict is actually necessary for
defining what is important about oneself and the polity to which individuals
belong, and for instigating important social change (e.g., the elimination of
slavery, the movements toward racial and gender equality, as well as increased
democratic participation in many nations). Agreement on all human values is
unlikely given human diversity, deep-seated cultural norms, and the variation
of human needs and desires.
2. Even if we cannot all agree on substantive norms and goals, we can
probably agree on some processes for making decisions that will enable us to
go forward and act. We might have some virtually universal ideas about
procedural fairness, like the ability to "make a case" and "be heard" and to
have impartiality and fairness govern any decision-making process. Some
might go further and suggest that some participation in the process by which
decisions are made is essential to the legitimacy of a process (with or without
commitments to democratic political regimes).
3. There is historical (and I would add functional) variation to what those
fair procedures might be in any particular context, as long as all (not just
"both") parties are given an opportunity to be heard on (or, I would add,
participate in) decisions affecting them. This is the principle of process pluralism (which is of defining importance to the modern dispute resolution movement and is what distinguishes us, conflict theorists and practitioners, from
more conventional jurisprudes who often still see conventional legal processes
as the only way forward to substantive justice).
4. Conflict resolution is a human skill (to be theorized about, taught,
learned, and practiced) and a difficult but highly valued one at that. I would
add it is more than a single skill, constituting a multidimensional set of skills,
implicating abilities to listen, articulate, advocate, empathize, analyze, facilitate, create, manage, and care about people and their problems, issues, values,
and material well-being.

3.

Id. at 5.

4.

Id. at 18.

5.

Id. at 35.
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Process Pluralism
Yet, if procedural justice is important to modern justice seekers, it is also
important to recognize that particular processes do affect outcomes. This is
what drew me away from focusing on limited legal remedies to thinking more
broadly about substantive problem solving and conflict resolution in deeper
and richer sociological and psychological contexts.6 While process pluralism
allows us to choose different processes for functional or other reasons, we
must also consider that the choice of a particular process will almost certainly
affect the outcome we produce. This is the basic principle of my own work in
negotiation: to choose an adversarial process, whether litigative or negotiable,
is to limit the field of possible outcomes to distributive arrangements (binary
or zero or negative sum solutions, stalemates, or unprincipled compromises).
To choose another process may allow for more creative, joint-gain, wealthcreating, and satisfactory possibilities to emerge. 7 Thus, process pluralism has
both a darker and a lighter side. While more choices of process might appear
to improve substantive outcomes, especially with more party participation,
each process produces its own morality (an insight we owe to legal philosopher and practitioner Lon FullerS) and structures its own solutions and
outcomes. Critics suggest that coercive pushes toward participatory processes
seeking consensus and false "harmony" may be just as unjust as the harderedged and more hierarchical conventional institutions. 9
With increasing sensitivity to the notion that different processes produce
different outcomes, modern analysts are now looking at how particular conflict and dispute resolution or democratic processes (rational-principled vs.
preference trading-bargaining, open vs. closed, plenary vs. committee) produce different results, even in such value-laden deliberations as constitution
making lO and in such complex settings as private and governmental organizations, as well as in both private and public international settings.
For me, a focus on how we deal with human conflicts in a wide range of
contexts (from the individual to the dyadic; group, organizational, social, and
relational; commercial as well as political; local, domestic, and international)
raises issues of inevitable tensions among and between the very values about
which we have conflicts. Can peace be achieved without justice? Can justice be
achieved without peace? Is law a proper measure ofjustice? If not law, what is?
6.

See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Legal Negotiation: A Study of Strategies in Search of a Theory,
1983 Am. B. Found. Res.]. 905.

7.

See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation: The Structure of
Problem Solving, 31 UCLA L. Rev. 754 (1984).

8.

For the full collection of Fuller's essays on legal process variations and the internal and
separate "integrity" of each process, see Lon L. Fuller, The Principles of Social Order:
Selected Essays of Lon L. Fuller, rev. ed., ed. Kenneth I. Winston (Oxford, 2001) (1981).

9.

See, e.g., Laura Nader, Controlling Processes in the Practice of Law: Hierarchy and Pacification in the Movement to Re-form Dispute Ideology, 9 Ohio St. J. on Disp. Resol. 1 (1993).

10. See Jack Rakove, The Great Compromise: Ideas, Interests and the Politics of Constitution
Making, 44 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 424 (1987); Jon Elster, Strategic Uses of Argument, in
Barriers to Conflict Resolution, eds. Kenneth]. Arrow et al. (New York, 1995); Dana Lansky,
Proceeding to a Constitution: A Multi-Party Negotiation Analysis of the Constitutional
Convention of 1787,5 Harv. Negot. L. Rev. 279 (2000).
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How much should individual or group parties be able to craft their own
arrangements or agreements to proceed with social, economic, and political
life without consideration of the effects of their arrangements on others? Must
all dispute or conflict resolution be accountable to those outside of the
dispute itself? When is a "dispute" between two parties really a "polycentric"
conflict, affecting others, or implicating more enmeshed social values? If
there is process pluralism, how are we to judge if the "proper" process has
been chosen for the particular matter at hand? These are some of the questions to be explored.
Like Stuart Hampshire, I believe in procedural justice as justice because we
need ways to talk to and struggle with each other about how to move forward
when we disagree. Unlike Stuart Hampshire, I do not adopt the streamlined
and universalized definition he gives of procedural justice as reducing to "the
adversary principle" of (merely) '~hearing the other side." Much of my work
has been devoted to demonstrating that most disputes and conflicts do not
have only two sides, either of parties or "players" (plaintiffs and defendants) or
"issues" or arguments (win/lose, yes/no). In our postmodern and fractured
world, many disputes and conflicts are, in fact, characterized by complicated
issues (e.g., resource allocation), multiple-party responsibility (are we past
single fault attributions and simplistic causal assumptions in law yet, or do we
lag so far behind science?), and generational and other "third-party" impacts
(for example, in environmental and family dissolution matters). In my view,
we need both new multiparty processes (beyond the outmoded two-sided
adversary system!!) and new substantively creative solutions!2 (beyond the
"limited remedial imagination of courts [and other legal institutions] "!3) to
find justice in our increasingly diverse postmodern world.
In this essay I outline the challenges, cleavages, and consensuses that have
emerged as the field of dispute processing or conflict resolution has attempted to create, define, and implement institutions and processes of procedural justice. Throughout, a few important themes recur, with implications
for how dispute resolution should be taught.
Of Disputes and Conflicts and Dispute Processing and Conflict Resolution
The field is now variously referred to as dispute resolution, alternative
dispute resolution (assuming all processes other than adjudication are alternative), or appropriate dispute resolution (assuming functional fits of "forums to
fusses"!4). More broadly, conflict resolution demonstrates, in its multifarious
nomenclature, its rather promiscuous or multiple-heritage ancestry. Many
different intellectual disciplines have contributed basic concepts, research

11. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Trouble with the Adversary System in a Postmodern,
Multicultural World, 38 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 5 (1996).
12. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Aha? Is Creativity Possible in Legal Problem Solving and Teachable
in Legal Education? 6 Harv. Negot. L. Rev. 97 (2001).
13. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 7, at 791.
14. Frank E. A. Sander & Stephen B. Goldberg, Fitting the Forum to the Fuss: A User-Friendly
Guide to Selecting an ADR Procedure, 10 Negot.J. 49 (1994).
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agendas, institutional forms, and professional roles, enactments, and practices.
For purposes of some (perhaps artificial) clarity, I suggest here, as I review the
history of the development of the field and its key ideas and concepts, that
"disputes" and "dispute resolution" have been constituted by the legal field,
and "conflicts" and "conflict resolution" by the broader pastiche of the social
sciences (anthropology, political science, international relations, sociology,
psychology, history, economics, and game theory) and their more
multidisciplinary social activist spinoffs, such as peace studies,15 social movement theory and practice, 16 and conflict resolution. 17 While "disputes" may be
about legal cases, conflicts are more broadly and deeply about human relations
and transactions. Conflict "handling" may be both more and less involving and
complicated than "dispute settlement" or "conflict management."
The study of "dispute processing" is a sort of bridge terminology and field,
having been constituted by legal anthropologists (some of whom were and are
lawyers) to move the focus away from legally constructed "cases" to the
broader notion of culturally and contextually embedded "disputes" having
existences, before, during, and after formal legal disputes. IS This rich line of
both theorizing and empirical study of dispute processing in the tradition of
sociolegal studies l9 has sought to study disputants, their representatives, the
context and content of their disputes, and the varieties of processes chosen to
"process" (not necessarily to resolve or manage) their disputes, in order to
uncover what social processes and relationships, in addition to, or other than,
"law," influence what actually happens to disputes.
The sociolegal focus on "disputing processes" de-centers-but does not
eliminate-law as the primary variable explaining how disputes are resolved.
It was a natural derivative of the school oflegal realism, which in its own time
de-centered doctrine in legal studies and, indeed, provided the first generation of dispute resolution scholars and practitioners-among them Lon
Fuller, Soia Mentschikoff, and Karl Llewellyn-who studied legal institutions
where doctrine was made, enforced, and sometimes resisted or transformed
in practice. 20
15. John Paul Lederach, Preparing for Peace: Conflict Transformation Across Cultures (Syracuse, 1995).
16. Peter Ackerman & Jack Duvall, A Force More Powerful: A Century of Nonviolent Conflict
(New York, 2000).
17. Oliver Ramsbotham et al., Contemporary Conflict Resolution: The Prevention, Management
and Transformation of Deadly Conflict (Cambridge, 1999); Louis Kriesberg, Constructive
Conflicts: From Escalation to Resolution (Lanham, 1998).
18. Karl Llewellyn & E. Adamson Hoebel, The Cheyenne Way: Conflict and Case Law in
Primitive Jurisprudence (Norman, 1941); Richard Abel, A Comparative Theory of Dispute
Institutions in Society, 8 Law & Soc'y Rev. 217 (1973); William L. F. Felstiner, Influences of
Social Organization on Dispute Processing, 9 Law & Soc'y Rev. 63 (1974); William L. F.
Felstiner et al., The Emergence and Transformation of Disputes: Naming, Blaming, Claiming ... ,15 Law & Soc'y Rev. 631 (1980-81); The Disputing Process: Law in Ten Societies, eds.
Laura Nader & Harry F. ToddJr. (New York, 1978).
19. See 15 Law & Soc'y Rev. 391 (1980-81) (special issue on dispute processing and civil
litigation) .
20. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Mothers and Fathers ofInvention: The Intellectual Founders of
ADR, 16 Ohio St.]. on Disp. Resol. 1 (2000).
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The study of conflict and conflict resolution dearly predates the focus on
disputes and dispute resolution institutions in the law. Sociologists such as
Emile Durkheim, Karl Marx, Georg Simmel,21 and Lewis A. Coser22 were
interested in both the structure and function of various forms of conflict in
society. It was sociologists who first argued 'for the constructive role of conflict
and the positive social change dimensions of conflict in society.
Social psychologists took up the study of conflict, in both its "destructive"
and "constructive" forms,23 as they focused on both individual and group
behaviors in preventing, making, escalating, resolving, and reconciling conflict. 24 A different group of social psychologists studied and created a new
field, "procedural justice," which empirically examined differences with respect to expectations and performances in different process settings (contrasting, for example, adversarial structures with inquisitorial ones,25 and mediation and arbitration forms with adjudication). These social scientists have
documented that participants in dispute resolution processes have a strong
desire for "procedural fairness" that may be more robust than their satisfaction or concerns about actual outcomes. 26
Social psychologists have more recently focused on how human cognitive
errors both produce conflict and prevent us from resolving conflicts in rational and efficient ways, identifYing a group of heuristic and strategic errors we
make in processing information and forming preferences when we interact
with others. 27
Sociologists and social psychologists together have produced a variety of
typologies and taxonomies of types of conflicts, specifYing such variations as
material vs. nonmaterial (value- or needs-based) conflicts; perceptual, behavioral, and attitudinal conflicts; malleability or changeability of the res in
conflict; numbers of parties in conflict (dyadic vs. multiparty); intergroup

21. Conflict and the Web ofIntergroup Affiliations (New York, 1955).
22. The Functions of Social Conflict (Glencoe, 1956),
23. Morton Deutsch, The Resolution of Conflict: Constructive and Destructive Processes (New
Haven, 1973); Kurt Lewin, Resolving Social Conflicts (New York, 1948),
24, Dean G. Pruitt & Jeffrey Z. Rubin, Social Conflict: Escalation, Stalemate and Settlement (New
York,1986).
25. E, Allen Lind & Tom R. Tyler, The Social Psychology of Procedural Justice (New York, 1988);
John Thibaut & Laurens Walker, Procedural Justice: A Psychological Analysis (Hillsdale,
1975) .
26. E. Allen Lind et aI., In the Eye of the Beholder: Tort Litigants' Evaluations of Their
Experiences in the Civil Justice System, 24 Law & Soc'y Rev. 953 (1990).
27. See Barriers to Conflict Resolution, supra note lO;James Reason, Human Error (Cambridge,
1990); Richard Nisbett & Lee Ross, Human Inference: Strategies and Shortcomings of Social
Judgment (Englewood Cliffs, 1980); Lee Ross & Richard E. Nisbett, The Person and the
Situation: Perspectives of Social Psychology (Philadelphia, 1991); Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heruristics and Biases, eds. Daniel Kahneman et al. (Cambridge, 1982); Max H.
Bazerman & MargaretA. Neale, Negotiating Rationally (New York, 1992); Max H. Bazerman,
Judgment in Managerial Decision Making, 5th ed. (New York, 2002).
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(e.g., nation-state) vs. intragroup (organizational) conflicts; and intrapersonal
vs. interpersonal conflicts. Efforts at cataloging types of conflicts, replicated in
political science for both domestic and international disputes and conflicts,
and now law, are based on the rationalistic hopes that taxonomies of characteristics will enable us to collect data, identify patterns or "indicators," and
make predictions for the trajectory of a conflict and perhaps for its "treatment" in various forms of prescriptive conflict resolution interventions.
Cultural variations in how conflicts are defined, experienced, and acted on
have engaged anthropologists since at least the nineteenth century.28 Now the
old debates about cultural differences have reared their heads again in claims
of "clashes of civilizations," both in the definitions of and the "processing"
(including interpretation or "meaning making") of conflicts, at nation-state,
cultural, ethnic, religious, group, and individuallevels. 29 Some of our Americanized-"newer"-forms of dispute resolution are derived from older forms
in other cultures and, some would say, lose something in the translation,
derived from Mrican moots 30 or Asian mediation 3 ! even as they try both to
adopt new cultural forms and "mediate" cultural diversity within one nation
and its internal disputes. 32
International relations theorists, who were among the first to formally study
negotiation processes (along with game theorists and mathematicians, developing models for strategic interactions in war and Cold War settings), have
reemerged as organizers of both theoretical and empirical propositions to test
in modern international crisis33 (see, e.g., the role of deadline and "ripeness"
in dispute settlement34 ). Roger Fisher, key developer of the "principled negotiation" model of integrative negotiation in Getting to Yes,35 although a law
professor at the time, developed many of his insights from international and
diplomatic service in the U.S. State Department. 36

28. Kevin Avruch, Type I and Type II Errors in Culturally Sensitive Conflict Resolution Practice,
20 Conflict Resol. Q.351 (2003); Kevin Avruch, Culture and Conflict Resolution (Washington, 1998).
29. Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New
York, 1996).
30. P. H. Gulliver, Disputes and Negotiations: A Cross-Cultural Perspective (New York, 1979).
31. Stanley B. Lubman, Dispute Resolution in China After Deng Xiaoping: "Mao and Mediation"
Re\~sited, 11 Colum. J. Asian L. 229 (1997).
32. The Conflict and Culture Reader, ed. Pat K Chew (New York, 2001).
33. Herding Cats: Multiparty Mediation in a Complex World, eds. Chester A. Crocker et aI.
(Washington, 1999) [hereinafter Herding Cats]; Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict, eds. Chester A. Crocker et aI. (Washington, 2001) [hereinafter
Turbulent Peace].
34. I. William Zartman, Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa (New York,
1985); Robert Malley & Hussein Agha, Camp David: The Tragedy of Errors, N.Y. Rev. Books,
Aug. 9, 2001, at 59; George]. Mitchell, Making Peace (New York, 1999).
35. Roger Fisher et aI., Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In, 2d ed. (Boston,
1991).
36. Roger Fisher, International Conflict for Beginners (New York, J969).
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Looking at choices about how to behave in conflict situations, theorists
(from game theory, mathematics, economics, and political science)37 have
inspired both laboratory and empirical studies of strategic behavior and
interaction, focusing on how participants in a conflict or dispute situation
respond to their own inner needs and interests, those of clients or principals
(in representative settings38 ), and to the "others" (adversaries or partners) in
settings where more than one person is needed to coordinate action or
respond to a conflict. Some of the earliest and best work in conflict theory has
been derived from organizational management,39 labor relations,4o and the
applied sciences of decision making41 and problem solving. 42
A new turn in political theory and practice, with implications (see below)
for legal dispute resolution, has focused on processes that foster democratic
discourse and enhance opportunities for participation in decisions that affect
the polity. Informed by the moral and social philosophy of J urgen Habermas
seeking "ideal speech conditions,"43 this new theory attempts to describe
alternative processes to maximize citizen participation in policymaking and
resolution of contested disputes where inevitable value differences occur with
increasingly diverse populations. Political theorists 44 and policy activists45 have
37. E.g., John von Neuman & Oscar Morgenstern, Theory of Games and Economic Behavior
(Princeton, 1944); Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge, Mass., 1960);
R. Duncan Luce & Howard Raiffa, Games and Decisions: Introduction and Critical Survey
(New York, 1957); John F. Nash, The Bargaining Problem, 18 Econometrica 155 (1950);
John F. Nash, Two-Person Cooperative Games, 21 Econometrica 128 (1953); Robert Axelrod,
The Evolution of Cooperation (New York, 1984); Steven J. Brams & Alan D. Taylor, Fair
Division: From Cake-Cutting to Dispute Resolution (Cambridge, 1996).
38. Negotiating on Behalf of Others: Advice to Lawyers, Business Executives, Sports Agents,
Diplomats, Politicians, and Everybody Else, eds. Robert H. Mnookin & Lawrence E. Susskind
(Thousand Oaks, 1999); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Lawyer Negotiations: Theories and Realities-What We Learn from Mediation, 56 Mod. L. Rev. 361 (1993).
39. Mary Parker Follett, Constructive Conflict, in Mary Parker Follett: Prophet of Management: A
Celebration of Writings from the 1920's, ed. Pauline Graham (Boston, 1996); Robert Rogers
Blake, Managing Intergroup Conflict in Industry (Houston, 1964); K Thomas, Conflict and
Conflict Management, in Handbook of Industrial Organizational Psychology, ed. M. D.
Dunnette 889 (Chicago, 1976).
40. Richard E. Walton & Robert B. McKersie, A Behavioral Theory of Labor Negotiations: An
Analysis ofa Social Interaction System (New York, 1965).
41. John S. Hammond et aI., Smart Choices: A Practical Guide to Making Better Decisions
(Boston, 1999); Gary Klein, Sources of Power: How People Make Decisions (Cambridge,
1999); Richard J. Zeckhauser et aI., Wise Choices: Decisions, Games, and Negotiations
(Boston, 1996).
42. James L. Adams, Conceptual Blockbusting: A Guide to Better Ideas (Reading, 1974).
43. Jiirgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law
and Democracy, trans. William Rehg (Cambridge, Mass., 1996);Jiirgen Habermas, Discourse
Ethics, trans. Christian Lenhardt & Shierry Weber Nicholsen, in Moral Consciousness and
Communicative Action (Cambridge, 1990) ;Jiirgen Habermas, 1 & 2 The Theory ofCommunicative Action (Boston, 1984).
44. Robert A. Dahl, On Democracy (New Haven, 1998); Amy Gutmann & Dennis Thompson,
Democracyand Disagreement (Cambridge, Mass., 1996);Jane Mansbridge, Beyond Adversarial
Democracy (New York, 1980); James Bohman, Public Deliberation: Pluralism, Complexity,
and Democracy (Cambridge, Mass., 1996); James S. Fishkin, Democracy and Deliberation:
New Directions for Democratic Reform (New Haven, 1991).
45. Carmen Sirianni & Lewis Friedland, Civic Innovation in America: Community Empowerment, Public Policy, and the Movement for Civic Renewal (Berkeley, 2001); Lawrence
Susskind & Liora Zion, Can America's Democracy Be Improved? (N.D.)
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suggested new ways for developing alternative processes to our formally
constitutionalized governmental institutions of executive, legislative, and judicial power: ad hoc policymaking groups,46 negotiated rule making,47 regionalized or substantively organized decision making,48 and "public conversations"
that seek to enhance human understanding, if not effectuate particular outcomes or agreements 49-all based on different notions of "negotiated" agreements of the polity.
To the extent that the new multidisciplinary field of conflict resolution 50
has been born out of these different disciplines, there is an interesting mix of
individual, organizational, theoretical, empirical, and professional levels of
theory, practice, and policy. Conflict resolution theory, research, and practice
now focus on the development of professionals in negotiation, mediation,
facilitation, consensus building, and other conflict resolution skills; the empirical study of particular kinds of conflicts (domestic, as well as international); and the institutional design and evaluation of particular approaches
to structuring conflict resolution or management.
Legal Processes, Legal Institutions, and the Law in Conflict Resolution
It was precisely because the legal field's focus on "legal disputes" or cases
was so narrow and explained so little that I first began to think and write about
legal disputes and the search for justice in a broader disciplinary framework. 5l
As a practicing lawyer for the poor and then as a legal clinician teaching law
students how to be lawyers, I was struck by the insufficiency of legal remedies
at solving clients' underlying problems and addressing underlying needs. 52
Legal disputes were a much narrower subset of actual human, social, political,
and economic conflicts.
In order to understand how legal disputes might better be resolved, I
turned to a number of different disciplines (sociology, political science,
psychology, economics, mathematics, game theory, international relations,
and the newer peace studies and conflict resolution) for theoretical frameworks to help me understand how human problems were resolved in realms
outside oflaw. My essay "Legal Negotiation: A Study of Strategies in Search of
a Theory" -was a review of this literature, both scholarly and popular, to
46. The Consensus Building Handbook: A Comprehensive Guide to Reaching Agreement, eds.
Lawrence Susskind et al. (Thousand Oaks, 1999) [hereinafter Consensus Building Handbook].
47. Philip]. Harter, Negotiating Regulations: A Cure for Malaise, 71 Geo. LJ. 1 (1982);Jody
Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA L. Rev. 1 (1997).
48. Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98
Colum. L. Rev. 267 (1998); Judith S. Kaye, Changing Courts in Changing Times: The Need
for a Fresh Look at How Courts Are Run, 48 Hastings LJ .. 851 (1997); Greg Berman &John
Feinblatt, Problem Solving Courts: A Primer, 23 Law & Pol'y Q. 125 (2001).
49. Michelle LeBaron & Nike Carstarphen, Finding Common Ground on Abortion, in Consensus Building Handbook, supra note 46.
50. Kriesberg, supra note 17; The Handbook of Conflict Resolution: Theory and Practice, eds.
Morton Deutsch & Peter T. Coleman (San Francisco, 2000).
51. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 6.
52. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 7.
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demonstrate that other fields had gone much further than law,jurisprudence,
and even the newer clinical study of law to develop models and frameworks
for studying negotiation processes for human dispute resolution and problem solving. 53
The strategic work of game theorists to understand interactions of, first,
two parties, and then, more than two parties, in situations of perfect, mixed, or
no information seemed to have great resonance for legal disputes, which,
culturally at least, are most often conceived of as competitive, distributive
games of allocation of limited resources (mostly money in lawsuits, but also
stock, land, and even children in child custody cases, and other "tangibles"
that might not be divisible at all). Strategic moves to maximize money or
tangibles, on behalf of a client, seemed the lawyer's most common default
behavior, based on assumptions of resource scarcity and goals of client maximization. If the law's purpose was to declare right and wrong, then disputes
resolved in legal institutions, like courts or legislatures, were likely to have
binary outcomes (or compromises-typically split-the-difference compromises-based on binary claims). The job of the conventional adversarial
lawyer, like the payoff-maximizing game player, was to gather as much of the
goods or goodies for the client as possible. Advocacy in court was seen as
directly transferable to adversarial persuasion techniques in negotiation, where
only the audience differed. 54
From a broader perspective, much of this emphasis on competitive strategies in negotiation mirrored strategic, if deterrent, approaches to larger
political conflicts in the Cold War era. Many social commentators have suggested that although law may be the leading "adversarial" institution, much in
Anglo-American culture is based on adversary argument, from the media to
politics to education to gender relations. 55 Social psychologists, labor negotiators, organizational development specialists, and anthropologists, however,
focused on a broader catalog of human behavior, suggesting, at the very least,
that there was a greater variety of human approaches to negotiated problems,
differentiating integrative possibilities (substantive "trades" of differentially
valued items) with use of different human interactional processes (cooperation, collaboration, and adaptation 56 ).
I studied this multidisciplinary literature for insights into two aspects of
dispute and conflict resolution in law that remain present in my work today:
(1) dispute resolution involves both process and substance, and (2) these elements of any human problem interact and are constitutive of each other.
Thus, to the extent that one considers the res of a problem to be an indivisible
tangible item or an uncompromisable principle or belief, then competition is

53. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 6.
54. See, e.g., Herb Cohen, You Can Negotiate Anything: The World's Best Negotiator Tells You
How to Get What You Want (Secaucus, 1980).
55. Deborah Tannen, The Argument Culture: Moving from Debate to Dialogue (New York,
1998) .
56. P. Terrence Hopmann, Bargaining and Problem Solving: Two Perspectives on International
Negotiation, in Turbulent Peace, supra note 33.
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likely to be the process chosen. In turn, this choice of process (adversarialism
or competition) will affect (and limit) the possible outcomes to binary, compromised, or stalemated or impasse solutions.57 Different orientations, mindsets,
frameworks, approaches, or assumptions (after analysis about the res, the
number of parties, etc.) about what the matter is about58 should cause the
skilled negotiator to choose appropriate processes (to be enacted in the artful
practice or behavioral aspects of conflict resolution) for the kind of matter
at hand.
In short, as I have now written many times (and taught thousands of
students over the years), conflict resolution involves both cognitive (the "science" or analysis of any conflict or dispute) and behavioral (the "art" and
practice of conflict resolution and problem solving) components. We must
learn to analyze and understand what conflicts and disputes are about, in their
full contextual complexity,59 before we can choose the appropriate behavioral
response. Once we have decided on our goals and desired outcomes, we can
seek to achieve them with a broader repertoire of processes and behaviors
(whether goals are defined as maximizing individual or joint gain, or seeking
Pareto-optimal or 'Just" solutions). That broader repertoire of behaviors
(communication skills, creative problem solving, questioning, as well as persuading, listening, synthesizing, as well as analyzing) can and must be taught. 5O
Legal problem solving is not just about adversarial argument or persuasion
about what is "right" for the client; it is about understanding a range of
possible goals for clients and those with whom they interact, and seeking both
substantive outcomes and appropriate processes to satisfy the needs and
interests of clients and those engaged in activity with the client.
But mere analysis of the status quo was not all that I had in mind. In one of
those wonderful moments of intellectual convergence (more pretentiously
described as a "paradigm shift" in the sociology of science61 ), many critics of
the legal system were focused not only on the increasing costs and delays of
the litigation system 62 (what I have labeled the "quantitative" approach to legal
conflict resolution), but on the quality of the solutions or resolutions produced by court orders or settlements negotiated in their "shadow."63 At about
57. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 7, at 760.
58. On the "science" of negotiation, see Howard Raiffa, The Art and Science of Negotiation:
How to Resolve Conflicts and Get the Best Out of Bargaining (Cambridge, Mass., 1982);
Howard Raiffa with John Richardson & David Metcalfe, Negotiation Analysis: The Science
and Art of Collective Decision-Making (Cambridge, Mass., 2002).
59. Including a variety of contextual factors specified in Menkel-Meadow, supra note 6, at 92728.
60. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, supra note 12; Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Taking Problem Solving
Pedagogy Seriously, 49 J. Legal Educ. 14 (1999); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Narrowing the Gap
by Narrowing the Field: "''hat's Missing from the MacCrate Repon-Of Skills, Legal Science
and Being a Human Being, 69 Wash. L. Rev. 593 (1994); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, To Solve
Problems, Not Make Them: Integrating ADR in the Law School Curriculum, 46 SMU L. Rev.
801 (1993).
61. Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago, 1970).
62. Frank E. A. Sander, Varieties of Dispute Processing, 77 F.R.D. III (1976).
63. Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of
Divorce, 88 Yale L. Rev. 950 (1979).
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the same time that I sought to reorient lawyers to a "problem-solving" approach to negotiation,r>4 Roger Fisher and the newly created Program on
Negotiation at Harvard University focused on "principled negotiation"65 to
develop models for negotiators to successfully pursue joint gain and agreements that are wise and efficient and improve-rather than destroy-relationships by looking for different kinds of "solutions" to legal, social, political, and
economic problems. I called it "creative problem-solving," but in more technical disciplinary terms this work asked lawyer-negotiators who had cultural
default assumptions about scarce resources and competitive behaviors to
think instead in terms of integrative solutions and wealth-creating rather than
wealth-destroying solutions (the negative-sum games of litigation and sunk
transaction costs).
In trying to reorient lawyers to a different set of assumptions about legal
problems, expanding and enhancing their substantive problem-solving skills,
I found that while others had gone before me, both inside and outside law,
lawyers seemed to need to be reminded of this important work. At the level of
searching for creative ways to manage conflict, to seek integrative solutions,
and to create pie-expanding rather than pie-diminishing solutions (I use
many food metaphors in my work!), the early work of administrative scientist
Mary Parker Follett and related work in labor-management relations66 were
key. Foundationally significant were social psychologists Abraham Maslow6 i
and George Homans,68 whose important work suggested that basic human
needs must be met for human flourishing and may be complementary for
different human beings, rather than always conflicting, for satisfactory human
interaction and problem solving.
At the level of process, the legal realists-Lon Fuller, Soia Mentschikoff,
and Karl Llewellyn, among others-suggested that different legal processes
and institutions (adjudication, arbitration, mediation, and "common business
practices" or social norms) served different functions and produced different
kinds of outcomes (often with their own jurisprudential justifications, integrity, or "morality"). I trace these and other earlier "roots" of modern legal
dispute resolution theory in "The Mothers and Fathers of Invention: The
Intellectual Founders of ADR. "69 My aspiration has been to continue this work
to add other processes to the mix (negotiation, facilitation, consensus building, and other multiparty processes) to analyze, understand, and implement
both process values (more participation and legitimacy of result) and substantive justice values (better "quality" and more tailored and creative solutions to
legal problems).
64. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 7.
65. Fisher et aI., supra note 35; Raiffa, supra note 58; David A. Lax & James K. Sebenius, The
Manager as Negotiator: Bargaining for Cooperation and Competitive Gain (New York,
1986).
66. Walton & McKersie, supra note 40.
67. Abraham Harold Maslow, The Farther Reaches of Human Nature (New York, 1971).
68. George Caspar Homans, Social Behavior: Its Elementary Forms (New York, 1961).
69. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 20.
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Viewing negotiation as one of the foundational blocks (in both theory and
practice) of good dispute resolution, I have focused on some counter-legal!
cultural notions. While compromise or a split-the-difference solution between
two high and opposite offers or demands is a common approach to traditional
legal negotiations (and, sadly, serves as the model for what is called Lloyds of
London settlement brokerage by judges in judicial settlement conferences70 ),
compromise is often an unprincipled result in legal negotiations where parties or lawyers fail to explore the full panoply of their various needs and
interests, including legal, economic, social, psychological, emotional, moral,
political, and religious. 71
Although Fisher, Vry, and Patton's template focuses on going behind
"positions" to look for parties' real "interests," which can often be met by
"efficient trades" of compatible, but not conflicting, interests (e.g., different
valuations of time, money, things, tax leveraging), I have urged a focus on
"needs" (in my case, from a feminist focus on human needs, but compatible
with John Burton's focus on human needs in the international dispute contexr72). As "needs" may stand behind or "under" even interests (often selfproclaimed and still assumed to be mostly economistically instrumental), the
lawyer can probe for (in interviews and other interactions with the client13 )
longer-term needs beyond the short-term, case-based "interests." The lawyer
may help uncover the needs of the client and other affected third parties. This
broader, social welfare (if perhaps somewhat maternalistic) approach to determining what actually may be at issue in a dispute is consistent with the
approach of many mediators and conflict resolvers to go beyond the "framed"
dispute to look at what the underlying conflict is really about and "reframe" it.
With a deeper and perhaps longer list of "needs," efficient trades continue
(perhaps there are more or fewer of them), but parties and their lawyers can
attempt to negotiate for deeper and ultimately more stable satisfaction among
the parties. Here, "compromise" is often only a last resort, after principles and
satisfaction or "trades" of needs are fully pursued or, in the language of
conventional bargainers, "exploited."
As I have argued elsewhere,74 compromise need not be seen as anathema to
jurisprudes who view principle and law as the sole measure of justice. John
Coons argued quite eloquently, long before the current work in legal dispute
resolution, that some legal matters are not capable of binary solutions (e.g.,
child custody, now institutionalized in joint legal custody; comparative fault,
now institutionalized in comparative negligence regimes; and mixed questions oflaw and fact with mixed legal responsibility or factual uncertainty, the

70. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, For and Against Settlement: Uses and Abuses of the Mandatory
Settlement Conference, 33 UCLA L. Rev. 485 (1985).
71. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 7.
72. See Conflict: Human Needs Theory, ed.John Wear Burton (London, 1990).
73. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Transformation of Disputes by Lawyers: What the Dispute
Paradigm Does and Does Not Tell Us, 2 Mo.]. Disp. Resol. 25 (1985).
74. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Whose Dispute Is It Anyway? A Philosophical and Democratic
Defense of Settlement (in Some Cases), 83 Geo. LJ. 2663 (1995).
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jury compromise), and so in some cases compromises or negotiated resolutions are actually more 'just" than more extreme binary solutions, precisely
because of their distributed "precision. "75 I have argued a somewhat related
point that while legal principles (especially statutory law, passed by legislatures
for the "average," "aggregate," or "typical" situation) may serve as "general"
justice, in particular cases justice may better be served by tailored "departures"
from the general rule (as long as the negotiated solutions are not otherwise
unlawful) .76 Negotiated justice may, then, for the individuals involved, be
more 'just" than legislated or court-ruled justice.
To the extent that negotiation and mediation, with their assumptions of
compromised results, have often appeared distasteful to principled and pure
jurisprudes, more recent extensions of some of Lon Fuller's work have usefully explored the internal (and external) integrity of both such processes and
such outcomes. Where issues or items are multifaceted or value is embedded
or connected in a web of other issues or parties (as in Fuller's classic division
of an art collection 77 ), trades, tailor-made solutions, or contingent agreements, linking past to future in dynamic and changeable solutions, are often
preferable to rigid, past-focused adjudication of "rights and responsibilities"
from rigid legal principles. At the macrosocietal level, even the much derogated Machiavelli has much to teach us about the value of compromise. 78 To
hold the polity together, the prince or leader (or lawyer) may not be too
"virtuous" (or principled) himself; it is his job to hold together a widely
divergent population with outcomes or solutions that are satisfactory to most
of the people most of the time, and he must, above all, be flexible. The
politician, who must work with others with different values from his, like the
lawyer, must consider long-term goals, future "deals," and the peace and
harmony of the larger community. To compromise is often to apprehend and
recognize the reality of the needs of the "other. "79
Thus, in modern negotiation theory, consideration of "the other" is as
important as consideration of gain for one's principal. "Getting to Yes" means
creating conditions so that the "other" will want to do what you ask of him, by
providing him with enough gain or needs satisfaction to render an agreement
better than the condition of no agreement at all. In negotiation parlance, the
negotiated agreement must be better than the BATNA (the Best Alternative
To a Negotiated Agreement). Focus on achieving joint gain, then, inspires the
good negotiator to be creative and look for substantive solutions that are
satisfactory or welfare enhancing for all parties. This is why working on
mutually agreed-to (truly consented-to) solutions seems so much more appealing to me than the coerced or commanded outcomes of formal legal institu75. John Coons, Compromise as Precise Justice, in NOMOS XXI Compromise in Ethics, Law,
and Politics, eds. J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman, (New York, 1979) [hereinafter
NOMOS XXI Compromise] ;John Coons, Approaches to Court-Imposed Compromise-The
Uses of Doubt and Reason, 58 Nw. L. Rev. 750 (1964).
76. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 74.
77. Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 Harv. L. Rev. 353, 394 (1978).
78. Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince, trans. George Bull, 90-92,101 (Baltimore, (1961).
79. Martin Golding, The Nature of Compromise, in NOMOS XXI Compromise, supra note 75.
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tions, which, even when ordering 'Just results," are so often resisted by hostilely defeated parties. (Though I would never argue that Brown v. Board of
Education was not a necessary court' decision that enunciated an important
social and constitutional norm of nondiscrimination, its failure to be immediately complied with is a product of resistance (and, sadly, popular will) to a
commanded court order.)
Much of negotiation and other nonadjudicative forms of legal dispute
resolution, thus, are justified on philosophical and political grounds of consent. The claim made on behalf of such nonadjudicative forms of dispute
resolution is that when commands from government-sponsored institutions,
like courts, are not required, decisions reached by the parties themselves or
facilitated by "wise elders" (as in many forms of mediation) 80 will have greater
legitimacy and longevity as the product of the parties' own agreements, rather
than commanded from on high.
This key underlying value of "consent" is itself contested, as many commentators have suggested that negotiation is more often a product of the power
(economic, legal, social, or other "endowments") that parties bring to the
negotiation, and thus may not always reflect "principled" negotiation, problem-solving impulses, or even "fair trades. "81 For such critics, the use of private
negotiation or now the more institutionalized forms of ADR (mediation,
arbitration, and related processes) may be dangerous because there is no state
supervision to ameliorate such power imbalances and to assure that important
legal principles are followed. Issues of social differences in negotiated processes, including race,82 gender,83 and class,84 have also called into question
the idea that negotiation can really serve disempowered parties to create
value or make better outcomes than they would receive in more formal legal institutions.
As a feminist, I have been a sympathetic participant in these critiques, but I
have also argued the important point that alternatives to litigation must be
measured against the fairness and power distributions in more conventional
litigation venues. So, in various articles, I have talked about the "baseline"
problem of being clear about what is being measured against what. 8s In my
parlance, "litigation romanticists" often presume equality of legal resources

80. Martin Shapiro, Courts: A Comparative and Political Analysis 80 (Chicago, 1981).
81. See, e.g., Tina Grillo, The Mediation Alternative: Process Dangers for Women, 100 Yale LJ.
1545 (1991); Owen Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 Yale LJ. 1073 (1984); Richard Delgado et aI.,
Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the Risk of Prejudice in Alternative Dispute Resolution,
1985 Wis. L. Rev. 1359.
82. Ian Ayres, Fair Driving: Gender and Race Discrimination in Retail Car Negotiations, 104
Harv. L. Rev. 817 (1991).
83. Deborah M. Kolb &Judith Williams, The Shadow Negotiation: How Women Can Master the
Hidden Agendas That Determine Bargaining Success (New York, 2000).
84. Iris Marion Young, Activist Challenges to Deliberative Democracy, 29 Pol. Theory 670
(2001).
85. See, e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, When Dispute Resolution Begets Disputes of Its Own:
Conflicts Among Dispute Professionals, 44 UCLA L. Rev. 1871 (1997); Menkel-Meadow,
supra note 74.
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(both money and competency) or judges willing to step out of their passive
role to ensure equal representation of all parties. Litigation, in my view, is no
more likely than alternatives to litigation to produce complete "fairness." We
do not yet have definitive empirical studies of these matters, as it is virtually
impossible to subject the same case to two different treatments (litigation or
some alternative) to test which outcomes are "better" (even if we could agree
on appropriate metrics). Is a "better" or "fairer" solution one that tracks the
law? Redistributes resources equitably among the parties? Maximizes joint
gain for the parties? Causes the least harm to the parties or those outside the
dispute? Or maximizes gain (or provides clearer precedent) for those outside
of the dispute? Alas, in my view, while game theory permits easier measurement of payoff schemes (especially in distributive games, but also in integrative games), the real legal world must consider not only the game players, but
also those affected by the game (the "human externalities" of any dispute) and
the longer-term effects on the system itself.
From Dyadic Negotiation to Mediation and Multiparty Processes
It is precisely because I have argued that we will never be able to fully answer

the question of whether litigation or particular forms of alternatives to litigation (and there are many of them) are always "better" or "fairer" or "morejust"
that I have followed in the path of Lon Fuller, and my own sociological training,
to suggest that it might give us greater explanatory purchase to study the
conditions under which particular forms or institutions of process might be
more advantageous than others. Thus, as the study of negotiated solutions
expanded to suggest facilitated negotiation (mediation) when the parties are
unable to craft their own solutions, I examined the different forms that
mediation, like negotiation, might take in different contexts. 86
When parties negotiate (even when attempting to solve problems or maximize joint gain), they are still subject to a host of strategic problems (e.g., the
giving and getting of information, whether and when to trust others, how
quickly to come to agreement versus pursuing long-term or dynamic issues in
a negotiation). The use of a third-party neutral to "manage" the negotiation
process, to facilitate communication, and to aid in the crafting of solutions has
increased the use and study of mediation in recent decades, even in the most
conventional onegal matters. Whether used in the pure Fullerian case-types of
ongoing relationships (business, labor, family) or now even in one-shot small
claims matters in lower courts,87 mediation is used not only to facilitate
communication and improve relations among the parties, but to prevent
"waste" at the negotiation table and to produce more Pareto-optimal solutions.
Like the efforts to categorize and generalize about different frameworks or
mindsets in negotiation, mediation has also been subjected to efforts at
taxonomies and typologies. Pure mediators are "facilitators" (of human communication, negotiation techniques) but never "decide" anything for the

86. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 73; Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Negotiating with Lawyers, Men and
Things: The Contextual Approach Still Matters, 17 Negot.J. 257 (2001).
87. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 38.
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parties (and are called therapeutic, by those outside of the field8S ). More
recently, at least in legal practice, it has been recognized that mediators,
though not deciding anything, as third-party neutrals would in arbitration,
may be "evaluators"S9 of parties' claims, arguments, and the likely legal outcome should cases go to full adjudication before a judge or jury. Mediators
often serve as reality testers, asking the parties to consider how realistic and
reasonable their plans are for the enforcement of the agreement. Mediation,
like negotiation, thus has the power to create relationships, rules, agreements,
and plans for the future (unlike the backward focus of most court decisions).
Efforts to demarcate various schools of mediation, such as "transformative
mediation" ("recognition and empowerment" of parties differentiated from
"problem-solving/settlement" of the dispute 90 ), when deracinated from the
context of the dispute or conflict, have seemed less useful to me than the
deeper, contextually based analysis of earlier scholars like Fuller and Mentschikoff. There are different mediation technologies, techniques, practices, and
approaches. For example, there are issues of more directive questioning; use
of separate meetings or caucuses; whether mediators should be totally "neutral" or merely "unbiased" or actually "enmeshed" in and knowledgeable
about the dispute or disputants. The more interesting question to me has
been whether there are universal or generalizable principles to be used in
applying these techniques to particular disputes, or whether context must
determine appropriate forms and techniques. In recent work I have explored
this difficult question of the generalizability of our propositional knowledge
bases with respect to particular forms of dispute resolution (e.g., the role of
"deadline" and privacy in both domestic and international disputes91 ) and in
particular contexts. 92 And, as more fully explored below, issues of techniques,
practices, and forms of participation may change depending on how many
parties or stakeholders are engaged in a dispute or conflict and whether the
conflict is a private matter (as in many but not all lawsuits) or a question of
public import (as in multiple-party class actions or governmental regulation
or public policy setting).
The Morality and Legitimacy of Process:
Macro and Micro Ethics Issues in Dispute Resolution
The issues surrounding appropriate use of different forms of dispute and
conflict resolution depend enormously, in my view, on the context. As various
forms of ADR have been institutionalized and their animating principles or
88. Susan S. Silbey & Sally E. Merry, Mediator Settlement Strategies, 8 Law & pory 7 (1986).
89. Leonard L. Riskin, Understanding Mediators' Orientations, Strategies, and Techniques: A
Grid for the Perplexed, 1 Harv. Negot. L. Rev. 7 (1996).
90. Robert A. Baruch Bush & Joseph P. Folger, The Promise of Mediation: Responding to
Conflict Through Empowerment and Recognition (San Francisco, 1994).
91. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Correspondences and Comparisons in International and Domestic
Dispute Resolution, 18 Negot.J. 367 (2002); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Correspondences and
Contradictions in International and Domestic Conflict Resolution: Lessons from General
Theory and Varied Contexts, 2003 J. Disp. Resol. 319.
92. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 86.
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sensibilities have been distorted,93 as in the importation of consensual dispute
resolution forms to commanded and compulsory use in courts and contracts,94 I have been raising issues about the appropriate regulations, rules,
and standards95 that should be applied when legal dispute resolution conflates
compulsory legal process and coerced participation with true consent and
party self-determination.96 Using different kinds of dispute and conflict resolution processes in different contexts (personal, organizational, contractual,
voluntary, litigative, compulsory, court-annexed, private, public, international)
presents enormous difficulties in different expectations of roles (for third
parties, disputing parties, and their lawyers,97 and for duties owed to those
affected by the dispute, as well as presenting concerns about the legitimacy of
the processes used. While I have written a great deal about the specific issues
of ethical practice in legal dispute resolution, including confidentiality, conflicts of interests, choice oflaws, fees, accountability and liability, competence,
credentialing, and candor (and participated in the drafting of several model
ethics codes 98 ), it is not the specifics of rules that I most worry about. What I
most worry about is the integrity of those seeking to help resolve conflict to
choose appropriate processes for their matters and then to utilize those
processes with a sense of integrity and fairness. In short, it is the foundational
values, and intent of the parties, rather than the specific rules, that matter most. 99
If, as Lon Fuller suggested decades ago, each process has its own uses and
"morality," then we must exert our best efforts in theory development and
practice to study what the morality of each process should be. This project has
become increasingly complex as the number of processes continues to increase and hybridize (from mediation to med-arb, to early neutral evaluation
in courts, to private mini trials, to public summary jury trials to minijury
trials, to consensus building fora to facilitated policymaking and negotiated
rule making), 100 thus making process-specific morality perhaps more difficult
to elucidate.
93. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Pursuing Settlement in an Adversary Culture: The Law of ADR, 19
Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 1 (1991).
94. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics Issues in Arbitration and Related Dispute Resolution Processes: What's Happening and What's Not, 56 Miami L. Rev. 949 (2002); Carrie MenkelMeadow, "Do the Haves Come Out Ahead" in Alternative Judicial Systems? Repeat Players in
ADR, 15 Ohio St.]. on Disp. Resol. 19 (1999).
95. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics in ADR: The Many "C's" of Professional Responsibility and
Dispute Resolution, 28 Fordham Urb. LJ. 979 (2001).
96. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics and Professionalism in Non-Adversarial Lawyering, 27 Fla. St.
U. L. Rev. 153 (1999); Menkel-Meadow, supra note 85; Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Silences
of the Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers: Lawyering as Only Adversary Practice, 10
Geo.]. Legal Ethics 631 (1997).
97. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics in ADR Representation: A Road Map of Critical Issues, 4 Disp.
Resol. Mag. 3 (1997).
98. See CPR-Georgetown Commission on Ethics and Standards in ADR, Proposed Model Rule
for the Lawyer as Third Party Neutral (2002) and Principles for ADR Provider Organizations
(2002), available at <http://www.cpradr.org>.
99. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, And Now a Word About Secular Humanism, Spirituality and the
Practice ofJustice and Conflict Resolution, 28 Fordham Urb. LJ. 1073 (2001).
100. Kathleen M. Scanlon, Drafter's Deskbook for Dispute Resolution Clauses (New York, 2002).
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The Future of Dispute Processing and Conflict Resolution: Of Multiple
Parties, Creative Solutions, and New Institutions for Resolving Conflict

As the twenty-first century has begun with some of the most horrific and
seemingly insoluble conflicts before us as human beings, beyond the individual disputes and conflicts of lawsuits to "virtual" or "viral" conflicts both
larger and more permeable than the nation-state, we will need all of the forms
of conflict resolution we can muster to attempt a peaceful future for the
human race. This seems a most propitious time for the further development
of the field of conflict resolution.

For me, the hope to solve problems through conflict resolution has always
seemed a sort of optimistic sensibility or leitmotiv, informing the way I look at
conflicts at both the individual and international level. Decades of interdisciplinary study have given me hope that we are continuing to make progress on
some key concepts-that we cannot solve problems with an exclusive focus on
self-interest or to~own command, but must consider the needs, interests,
and participation of others with whom we come into contact. I believe and
hope that there are possibilities to create solutions and resources in lieu of
destroying them in our interactions with each other. We must "create wealth"
in the sense of enhanced human well-being if we are to continue to inhabit the
planet with others who materially have less than we do. Sometimes we will
need help from wise intervenors, and those wise intervenors can develop more
knowledge about what is effective in their practice. I also believe that, while we
need experts to help in conflict resolution, being able to truly participate in
the decisions that affect our lives is a human necessity for legitimate societal
outcomes and for peaceful coexistence of people with divergent values, so
there is some tension between the aspirations of democratic participation and
expert facilitation in conflict resolution theory and practice.
In the context of these large and general assertions there are many interesting and concrete intellectual and practical projects to pursue. As we recognize
that many disputes now involve multiple parties (if even only the insurer in a
conventional two-party plaintiff-defendant lawsuit and the increased use of
class actions in a variety of legal contexts) and many issues, negotiation
theorists have appropriately turned their attention to development of theory
for multiparty, multiissue negotiations (drawn from legal, business, political,
and international disputes and conflicts), studying such issues as coalition
formation, group dynamics, negotiation in dynamic settings, the role of leadership and coordination, information processing, and the different dynamics
of competition, collaboration, cooperation, and coordination in multiparty
settings. 101 This theory is currently being tested in such fora as negotiated rule
making before administrative tribunals, in public policy settings,I02 in commu101. James K. Sebenius, Sequencing to Build Coalitions: With Whom Should I Talk First? in Wise
Choices: Decisions, Games, and Negotiations, eds. Richard J. Zeckhauser et al. (Boston,
1996); Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble? Why Groups Go to Extremes, 110 Yale LJ. 71
(2000).
102. Susan Carpenter & W. J. D. Kennedy, Managing Public Disputes: A Practical Guide for
Professionals in Government, Business and Citizen Groups (San Francisco, 2001); Consensus Building Handbook, supra note 46.
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nity disputes, in truth and reconciliation commissions,103 in public conversations and dialog projects all over the world,104 as well as in new forms of
conventional law courts, seeking multidisciplinary solutions to common problems (drugs, family dysfunction, etc.).!05
My own theoretical work has come to focus on how interdisciplinary conflict resolution theory can be reunited with legal and political theory,jurisprudence, and constitutional law to explore how these newer forms of conflict
resolution and dispute processing can become perhaps a fifth branch of
governance (beyond executive, legislative, judicial, and administrative) to a
form of ad hoc democracy of participation by the acted-upon that marries
modern democratic discourse theory to conflict resolution theory.106 At the
theoretical level, this work asks how we can form conflict resolution processes
that enable all forms of human discourse to be "heard" in Hampshire's terms.
Can we create "space" for human communication thaL simultaneously allows
for expression of (1) reasons, principles, and persuasion, (2) preference
trading and bargaining, and (3) passions, emotions, and beliefs, and that can
find a way for such expressions to enrich our understandings of each other
and find ways of solving specific problems?
Can we find ways to address the more general problem of coexistence with
varied and diverse needs and values?107 These are the future process and
jurisprudential issues-how can we develop processes that allow in and legitimate more than one form of discourse? Some new legal, governmental, and
private processes are already experimenting with these multiple levels of
discourse-negotiated rule making, problem-solving courts, and public conversations or dialogs to name a few. IDS New process institutions must be
responsive to foundational process values of participation, assent, selfdetermination, and mutual responsiveness and respect, while aspiring to
achieve both peace and justice. Many international efforts, like those in simple
legal dispute mediation, now proceed at both "informal" and "formal" levels
simultaneously. Two-track diplomacy plays out in the international arena as
caucuses are used in private mediation, exploring both bottom-up, informal,
private, and task-oriented problem solving, with more formal, facilitated, or
orchestrated public, transparent, and joint meetings.
My own recent work attempts to organize and explicate the differences in
process and process institutions that can be mapped according to the modes
of discourse (principled reasons, bargaining, and emotions) and different
103. Martha Minow, Between Vengeance and Forgiveness: Facing History After Genocide and
Mass Violence (Boston, 1998); Susan Collin Marks, Watching the Wind: Conflict Resolution
During South Africa's Transition to Democracy (Washington, 2000); Forgiveness and
Reconciliation: Religion, Public Policy and Conflict Transformation, eds. Raymond G.
Helmick & Rodney Lawrence Petersen (Philadelphia, 2001).
104. See Search for Common Ground at <http://www.sfcg.org>.
105. Kaye, supra note 48.
106. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Lawyer's Role in Deliberative Democracy (on file with author).
107. Lederach, supra note 15; Ackerman & Duvall, supra note 16; Herding Cats, supra note 33.
108. For some further examples, see Can·ie Menkel-Meadow, When Litigation Is Not the Only
Way: Consensus Building and Mediation as Public Interest Lawyering, 10 Wash. U.J.L. and
Poi'y, 37 (2002).
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forms of process (open/closed; plenary/committee; expert facilitator /
leaderless(naturalistic) for different.kinds of entities in conflict (permanent,
constitutive, temporary/ad hoc), with some examples as indicated in the
following chart.
Modes of Conflict Resolution
© 2002 Carrie Menkel-Meadow. Partially derived from categories specified by Jon Elster, Strategic Uses of
Argument, in Barriers to Conflict Resolution, eds. Kenneth Arrow et al. (New York, (995).

Mode of discourse

Principles (reasons)

Bargaining (interests)

Passions (needs/
emotions/religion

Forms of process
Closed

Some court
Negotiation-U .S.
proceedings; arbitration Constitution; diplomacy

Mediation
(e.g., divorce)

Open

French Constitution;
courts; arbitration

Public negotiations;
some labor

Dialog movement

Plenary

French Constitution

Regulation-negotiation Town meetings
or
negotiated rule-making

Committees

Faculty committees;
task groups

U.S. Constitution/
U.S. Congress

Caucuses; interest groups

Expert-Facilitator

Consensus building

Minitrial

Public conversations
Grassroots organizing/

Naturalistic (leaderless)

wro protests

Permanent

Government, institutions Business organizations,
unions

Religious organizations;
Alcoholics Anonymous,
Weight Watchers

Constitutive

U.N., national
constitutions

National constitutions/ Civil justice movements,
professional associations peace

Temporary/ad hoc

Issue organizations/
social justice

Interest groups

Yippies, New Age,
vigilantes

Principles = reasons, appeals to universalism, law
Bargaining = interests, preferences, trading, compromises
Open = public or transparent meetings or proceedings
Closed = confidential, secret process or even outcomes (settlements)
Plenary = full group participation, joint meetings
Committees= task groups, caucuses, parts of the whole
Expert-facilitator = led by expertise (process or substantive or both)
Naturalistic = leaderless, grassroots, ad hoc
Permanent (organizational, institutional)
Constitutive ("constitutional")
Temporary/ad hoc groups or disputants

At the substantive level, I think we have also learned that even in the largely
generalist domain of law we need more multidisciplinary forms of problem
solving. It is not enough to create new process institutions if we do not know
what problems they are supposed to solve. In "Aha? Is Creativity Possible in
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Legal Negotiation and Teachable in Legal Education?"109 I explore how new
scientific work in creativityllo and multiple forms of human intelligence lll can
be harnessed to legal problem solving to develop new legal concepts, tropes,
entities, and solutions to legal problems if we can really learn to think outside
of the box. Traditional legal thought, categories, remedies, and institutions
have served us moderately well in the Anglo-American world, with welldeveloped constitutional (both written and unwritten), common law, and
statutory solutions to many intra- and inter-national legal disputes. But these
institutions and ways of thinking have also been limiting. (Some are focused
on the past and are not flexible enough to adapt to rapidly changing social,
scientific, and political conditions; others are too binary in how "truth" is
established and how remedies can be awarded; still others exclude too many
of the people whose lives are affected by decisions taken on their behalf,
whether truly "representative" or not.) Some of these processes may not
appeal to our human need for healing, or spiritual or ethical "wholeness," or
deeper values of human connection.
In the parable of the good camping trip that we now use to teach the value
of human diversity, we are asked to consider whom we would want to take on a
moderately arduous trek through the mountains. Clearly we need a map
reader, navigator, astronomer, cook, storyteller, medical expert, botanist,
wood cutter, animal lover (and tamer or hunter, should we encounter hostile
forms of animal life), strong pack carriers, and perhaps a musician or clergy
person for the campfire at day's end. To whatever list any group makes up, I
would now add a "conflict resolver" or "process expert" who would be able to
handle, facilitate, and manage whatever internal conflicts such a diverse range
of talent would inevitably encounter (until such time as all of us, as human
beings, are "expert" in resolving our own conflicts, or at least have sufficient
skills to do it on our own). We need many substantive (and creative) approaches to questions of survival; we also will need to coordinate how we reach
solutions, answers, or agreements, even if they are only provisional, until
dynamics change, or new information is learned.
Just as legal dispute resolution has begun to evolve from traditional adversary adjudication in the courts as the exclusive or preferred method for legal
dispute resolution, human conflict resolution now requires a variety of substantive domains (science, physical, human, social, cultural, spiritual, artistic)
to search for ways to create peace and justice. The outlines of new substantive
ideas and solutions may still be obscure or illusory. The forms of process we
can use to come together are more varied and interesting than ever before.
We will need to develop new theory, experiment with new institutions, practices, and policies and then study and evaluate them for generalizability and
applicability to new and different situations. Our very survival depends on it.
What an exciting, if challenging, time· to be a conflict resolution theorist,
teacher, practitioner, and "process architect."
109. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 12.
110. See Mihaly CsikszenUUihalyi, Creativity: Flow and the Psychology of Discovery and Invention
(New York, 1996); Barry Nalebuff & Ian Ayres, Why Not? How to Use Everyday Ingenuity to
Solve Problems Big and Small (Boston, 2003).
111. Howard Gardner, Intelligence Reframed (New York, 1999); Howard Gardner, Frames of
Mind (New York, 1983).
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